Skip to main content

What is threat modeling?

Threat modeling is a structured way to analyze a system, work out what could go wrong, and decide which mitigations matter most.

Glossary
Updated 2 min read

Definition

Threat modeling

Also called Threat model, STRIDE

Threat modeling is the practice of analyzing a representation of a system to identify what could go wrong with its security and privacy, and deciding which countermeasures to apply.

How it works

The Threat Modeling Manifesto defines threat modeling as analyzing representations of a system to highlight concerns about security and privacy, and organizes it around four questions: What are we working on? What can go wrong? What are we going to do about it? Did we do a good enough job? OWASP adds that a threat model is a structured view of an application and its environment through the lens of security, and that the work typically produces a prioritized list of security improvements.

Teams usually start by drawing the system: components, data stores, data flows, and the trust boundaries between them. They then walk each element and ask what an attacker could do. Microsoft's Threat Modeling Tool uses the STRIDE categories to prompt those questions: spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, and elevation of privilege. Each threat gets a mitigation, an accepted risk, or a follow-up. The Manifesto stresses that the practice works best early and often, iterating with design changes rather than as a one-time compliance exercise.

Example

A team adds a feature that lets customers upload files. The data flow diagram shows files crossing from the internet into a storage bucket, then being processed by a backend service. STRIDE questions surface threats: malicious files exploiting the parser (tampering, elevation of privilege), one customer reading another's uploads (information disclosure), and huge uploads exhausting resources (denial of service). Each becomes a design requirement before code is written.

Why it matters for a SOC

Threat modeling is traditionally an application security practice, but the same thinking tells a SOC where to focus: which assets matter most, which paths an attacker would take to reach them, and which of those paths have no detection. That makes it a natural input for detection engineering and hypothesis-driven threat hunting. A practical way to connect the two:

  1. List the handful of assets that would hurt most if compromised, such as the identity provider, source code, production data, and finance systems.
  2. For each, sketch the likely attack paths, for example a stolen SSO session leading to a code repository.
  3. Map each step to a MITRE ATT&CK technique and to the log source that would record it.
  4. Mark which steps have a tested detection, which have logs but no detection, and which have no logs at all.

The last two categories are the detection and logging backlog, ordered by what they protect. Cotool applies the idea to the whole environment: it maps systems, the identities that use them, and the data they hold, builds a threat model of what attackers could reach and how, and keeps it updated as the environment changes so hunts and detections follow it.

Go deeper

Sources

  1. Threat Modeling | OWASP Foundation · accessed November 16, 2026
  2. Threat Modeling Manifesto · accessed November 16, 2026
  3. Threats - Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool - Azure · accessed November 16, 2026
  4. Security Log Storage and Federated Search for Agents | Cotool · accessed November 16, 2026

Attackers are scaling with tokens

Cotool helps defenders operate at machine speed. See how security teams are scaling Detection & Response.

Book a demo