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Sigma Detection Classification

Jan 2026

Multi-label classification of MITRE ATT&CK techniques from Sigma rules

Metric
View
Provider
2733 Sigma Detection Rules · 12 models · Jan 2026
RankModels (12)F1 ScorePrecisionRecallCost / TaskLatency
1
Claude Opus 4.5
66.0%67.5%69.2%$0.00382.5s
2
Claude Sonnet 4.5
60.0%57.7%68.6%$0.00223.1s
3
Gemini 3.0 Pro
57.2%56.2%63.6%$0.001725.1s
4
Gemini 3.0 Flash
56.4%51.3%71.4%$0.00049.0s
5
GPT-5.2
56.3%55.8%62.8%$0.00121.2s
6
GLM 4.7
55.2%55.2%60.5%$0.003951.5s
7
GPT-OSS 120B
48.9%47.3%56.3%$0.00075.0s
8
DeepSeek v3.2
48.0%50.3%48.9%$0.0000821.9s
9
MiniMax M2
47.4%48.2%50.9%$0.000521.4s
10
Claude Haiku 4.5
47.2%44.8%55.3%$0.00070.8s
Best F1 ScoreBest Open Weight
Dataset
SigmaHQ Rules
2733 Sigma Detection Rules
Detection Engineering
MITRE ATT&CK
SIEM
Windows
Linux
Cloud
Network
Application

About This Benchmark

This benchmark evaluates LLMs' intrinsic knowledge of detection engineering and the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Unlike agentic tasks where models can query external resources, this single-turn classification task tests what models have learned about adversary tradecraft during training. Given a Sigma rule's detection logic, title, and description (with MITRE tags stripped), models must predict all applicable technique IDs (e.g., T1059.001). The dataset comprises 2,733 rules from the SigmaHQ repository, covering Windows, Linux, cloud, and network detections.

Sample Tasks

Input•Certutil Base64 Decode Detection
title: File Decoded From Base64/Hex Via Certutil
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\\certutil.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-decode'
            - '-decodehex'
    condition: selection
Label•T1027 (Obfuscated Files or Information)
Input•PowerShell Download Cradle
title: Suspicious PowerShell Download Cradle
logsource:
    category: ps_script
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'IEX'
            - 'Invoke-Expression'
            - 'DownloadString'
    condition: selection
Label•T1059.001 (PowerShell), T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer)

Key Findings

Hierarchical F1

Claude Opus 4.5 had the highest hierarchical F1 at 66.0%. The top results among 12 evaluated models were Claude Opus 4.5 (66.0%), Claude Sonnet 4.5 (60.0%), Gemini 3.0 Pro (57.2%). These are observed scores on this benchmark.

F1 Score by ModelTop 10 of 12
  1. 1Claude Opus 4.566.0%
  2. 2Claude Sonnet 4.560.0%
  3. 3Gemini 3.0 Pro57.2%
  4. 4Gemini 3.0 Flash56.4%
  5. 5GPT-5.256.3%
  6. 6GLM 4.755.2%
  7. 7GPT-OSS 120B48.9%
  8. 8DeepSeek v3.248.0%
  9. 9MiniMax M247.4%
  10. 10Claude Haiku 4.547.2%

Open-weight results

GLM 4.7 (55.2%) had the highest score among the 6 open-weight models evaluated. GLM 4.7 cost $0.0039/task.

Cost per task

DeepSeek v3.2 had the lowest measured cost at $0.000082/task, with 48.0% hierarchical F1. Claude Opus 4.5 scored 66.0% at $0.0038/task. Costs reflect the evaluated task mix and the stated pricing assumptions.

Cost per TaskTop 10 of 12
  1. 1DeepSeek v3.2$0.000082
  2. 2Gemini 3.0 Flash$0.0004
  3. 3MiniMax M2$0.0005
  4. 4Claude Haiku 4.5$0.0007
  5. 5GPT-OSS 120B$0.0007
  6. 6GPT-OSS 20B$0.0008
  7. 7GPT-5.2$0.0012
  8. 8Qwen3 235B A22B$0.0013
  9. 9Gemini 3.0 Pro$0.0017
  10. 10Claude Sonnet 4.5$0.0022

Time per task

Claude Haiku 4.5 had the lowest reported average latency at 0.8s/task, with 47.2% hierarchical F1. Latency includes the work performed by the agent during evaluation.

Task Duration (avg)Top 10 of 12
  1. 1Claude Haiku 4.50.8s
  2. 2Qwen3 235B A22B1.0s
  3. 3GPT-5.21.2s
  4. 4DeepSeek v3.21.9s
  5. 5Claude Opus 4.52.5s
  6. 6Claude Sonnet 4.53.1s
  7. 7GPT-OSS 120B5.0s
  8. 8GPT-OSS 20B7.8s
  9. 9Gemini 3.0 Flash9.0s
  10. 10MiniMax M221.4s

Run completion

5 of 12 models completed all recorded runs without an unrecoverable error. Completion does not imply a correct answer or rule out a refusal.

Task Completion RateTop 10 of 12
  1. 1Claude Sonnet 4.5100.0%
  2. 2Gemini 3.0 Flash100.0%
  3. 3GPT-5.2100.0%
  4. 4Claude Haiku 4.5100.0%
  5. 5Qwen3 235B A22B100.0%
  6. 6Claude Opus 4.599.9%
  7. 7GPT-OSS 120B99.9%
  8. 8GPT-OSS 20B99.9%
  9. 9DeepSeek v3.299.8%
  10. 10MiniMax M299.8%

Measured Trade-offs

  • Claude Opus 4.5 — Highest observed hierarchical F1: 66.0% at $0.0038/task.
  • DeepSeek v3.2 — Lowest measured cost: $0.000082/task, with 48.0% hierarchical F1.
  • GLM 4.7 — Highest observed open-weight hierarchical F1: 55.2% at $0.0039/task.

Methodology

Scoring

  • F1 Score: Hierarchical F1 score accounting for MITRE technique hierarchy (partial credit for parent techniques)
  • Precision: Proportion of predicted techniques that are correct
  • Recall: Proportion of techniques that were correctly predicted
  • Cost / task: USD per task; one task is one Sigma rule

Task Design

  • Models receive a Sigma rule (title, description, detection logic) with MITRE tags stripped to prevent label leakage
  • Output is parsed as a comma-separated list of technique IDs (e.g., T1059, T1059.001)
  • Ground truth comes from the official attack.* tags authored in Sigma rules
  • Single-turn prediction tests intrinsic knowledge, no tool use or external lookups

Hierarchical Scoring

  • MITRE techniques follow a parent/sub-technique hierarchy (e.g., T1059 → T1059.001)
  • Exact match or more specific prediction (sub-technique when parent expected): 1.0 score
  • Less specific prediction (parent when sub-technique expected): 0.75 partial credit
  • Optimal greedy matching assigns predictions to ground truths maximizing total score
  • Hierarchical precision = (sum of match scores) / (number of predictions)
  • Hierarchical recall = (sum of match scores) / (number of ground truths)
  • This approach rewards semantic understanding of attack relationships over exact memorization

Controls

  • Same prompt template for all models, no per-model tuning
  • Models instructed to output ONLY comma-separated technique IDs (e.g., T1078, T1003.001)

Prompt Template

System
You are a cybersecurity expert specializing in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Your task is to analyze detection rules and identify which MITRE ATT&CK technique IDs they are designed to detect. MITRE ATT&CK technique IDs follow the format T#### (e.g., T1078, T1003) or T####.### for sub-techniques (e.g., T1078.003). Analyze the detection rule carefully and output ONLY a comma-separated list of technique IDs, nothing else.
User
Analyze this Sigma detection rule and identify the MITRE ATT&CK technique IDs it detects:
[Sigma Rule YAML]

Caveats

  • Ground truth labels are community-contributed: rule authors may annotate only a subset of applicable TTPs, making precision a noisy metric. A "false positive" may actually be a valid technique the author omitted.
  • Recall is the more reliable indicator of model quality, measuring how well the model covers the techniques the human author explicitly intended to assign.
  • Hierarchical scoring awards 0.75 partial credit for parent techniques, which may inflate scores compared to strict exact-match evaluation.
  • Some Sigma rules have ambiguous or overly broad MITRE mappings in the ground truth.

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