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Identity & Active Directory Attacks

Sep 2026

BlueBench-Simulation-002: Four simulated Windows identity-tier attacks (password spray, domain persistence, credential-attack detection, and a hands-on-keyboard operator) scored against complete hidden ground truth

Metric
Track
View
Provider
4 tasks · 24 models · Sep 2026
RankModels (24)ScoreSpread?Highest minus lowest score across recorded tasks and trials (percentage points). Lower is less variable.$/taskLat
1
Claude Opus 5.5
88.2%47.2pp$4.3413m 56s
2
Gemini 4 Argon
86.6%18.2pp$11.2621m 56s
3
GPT-6 Astra
86.1%47.2pp$13.098m 48s
4
Claude Sonnet 5.5
83.1%47.2pp$1.317m 24s
5
Grok 4.6
80.8%58.3pp$8.4731m 13s
6
GPT-6 Sol
79.5%55.6pp$2.7412m 57s
7
GPT-6.1 Sol
77.1%39.7pp$2.6112m 36s
8
Claude Opus 4.8
73.6%69.5pp$3.4514m 5s
9
Claude Haiku 5.5
72.5%43.9pp$1.1925m 20s
10
GPT-5.6 Sol
69.5%68.2pp$5.1310m 55s
Best ScoreBest Open Weight
Dataset
BlueBench-Simulation-002
4 tasks
Task Types
Threat Hunting·1 task(25%)
Incident Response·1 task(25%)
Detection Engineering·2 tasks(50%)
Threat Hunting
Incident Response
Detection Engineering
Simulation
Active Directory
Password Spray
Domain Persistence
Credential Access
Hands-on-Keyboard
Windows

About BlueBench-Simulation

BlueBench-Simulation takes a different approach from our intrusion benchmarks. Instead of replaying one real compromise, every environment is a fully generated enterprise environment: routine baseline activity, a simulated intrusion, and matched benign lookalikes designed to punish pattern-matching without verification. Because we author the environment, the ground truth is complete and none of the data can have leaked into training sets. Every case starts from a single weak alert; detection queries are scored deterministically and free-form reports are graded against the hidden rubric by a single fixed LLM judge.

The series splits twelve authored investigations along the attack lifecycle across three benchmarks: 001 Initial Access & Command-and-Control, 002 Identity & Active Directory Attacks, and 003 Impact & Exfiltration.

About This Benchmark

This benchmark covers the middle of the kill chain. The four tasks are about attacks on the identity tier, each on its own Windows Active Directory estate: an open-ended hunt for a password spray followed by account manipulation, an incident response investigation of domain persistence, a detection engineering assignment for service-credential theft on the domain controller, and a detection engineering assignment isolating a hands-on-keyboard operator's interactive commands inside the longest intrusion storyline in the series.

Each case starts from a single weak alert, with several thousand raw events drawn from endpoint, network, identity, and directory telemetry. The hunt and the incident response report are graded by the LLM judge; the two detection queries are scored deterministically. The current export contains 24 models with three trials per task: 288 runs. Costs and latency are reported per evaluated task attempt.

Sample Questions

Threat Hunting

Q: A behavioral deviation alert fires on the identity tier without naming a host or account. Hunt across all available telemetry, determine what is actually happening, and write a comprehensive threat-hunting report without assuming compromise.

A: [Free-form report scored against hidden fact and citation rubrics]

Incident Response

Q: A directory-lifecycle correlation alert fires on a Windows domain. Investigate end to end and write a self-contained incident report: scope, affected hosts and accounts, attacker tradecraft, impact, and the response actions the situation warrants.

A: [Free-form report plus response-action choices scored against hidden rubrics]

Detection Engineering

Q: Using the domain controller telemetry, identify the activity that harvested credential material for the domain’s service identities. Return the records constituting the theft and a detection query that excludes the domain’s routine service-authentication activity.

A: [Read-only detection query re-executed against the case evidence and scored by exact-record F1]

Key Findings

Results

Claude Opus 5.5 had the highest benchmark score at 88.2%. The top results among 24 evaluated models were Claude Opus 5.5 (88.2%), Gemini 4 Argon (86.6%), GPT-6 Astra (86.1%). These are observed scores on this benchmark.

Score by ModelTop 10 of 24
  1. 1Claude Opus 5.588.2%
  2. 2Gemini 4 Argon86.6%
  3. 3GPT-6 Astra86.1%
  4. 4Claude Sonnet 5.583.1%
  5. 5Grok 4.680.8%
  6. 6GPT-6 Sol79.5%
  7. 7GPT-6.1 Sol77.1%
  8. 8Claude Opus 4.873.6%
  9. 9Claude Haiku 5.572.5%
  10. 10GPT-5.6 Sol69.5%

Track results

Threat Hunting: Gemini 4 Argon led at 86.1%. Incident Response: Claude Sonnet 5.5 led at 99.3%. Detection Engineering: GPT-6 Astra led at 100.0%.

Open-weight results

GLM-5.3 Flash (62.3%) had the highest score among the 7 open-weight models evaluated. GLM-5.3 Flash cost $0.28/task.

Cost per task

GLM-5.3 Flash had the lowest measured cost at $0.28/task, with 62.3% benchmark score. Claude Opus 5.5 scored 88.2% at $4.34/task. Costs reflect the evaluated task mix and the stated pricing assumptions.

Cost per TaskTop 10 of 24
  1. 1GLM-5.3 Flash$0.28
  2. 2DeepSeek V4 Flash$0.31
  3. 3GPT-6 Luna$0.44
  4. 4Claude Haiku 5.5$1.19
  5. 5GPT-5.6 Luna$1.29
  6. 6Claude Sonnet 5.5$1.31
  7. 7DeepSeek V4 Pro$1.45
  8. 8MiniMax M3$1.49
  9. 9GPT-5.6 Terra$1.99
  10. 10GLM-5.2$2.46

Time per task

GPT-5.6 Terra had the lowest reported average latency at 6m 18s/task, with 65.7% benchmark score. Latency includes the work performed by the agent during evaluation.

Task Duration (avg)Top 10 of 24
  1. 1GPT-5.6 Terra6m 18s
  2. 2Claude Sonnet 5.57m 24s
  3. 3GPT-5.6 Luna8m 21s
  4. 4GPT-6 Astra8m 48s
  5. 5GPT-5.6 Sol10m 55s
  6. 6GLM-5.3 Flash12m 7s
  7. 7Claude Sonnet 512m 25s
  8. 8GPT-6.1 Sol12m 36s
  9. 9GPT-6 Sol12m 57s
  10. 10Claude Opus 5.513m 56s

Reliability: score spread

Gemini 4 Argon had the smallest observed score spread at 18.2 percentage points; its overall score was 86.6%. Spread is the highest minus lowest score across recorded tasks and trials. It includes differences in task difficulty and is not a measure of repeatability on one fixed task.

Score spread (percentage points)Top 10 of 24
  1. 1Gemini 4 Argon18.2pp
  2. 2GPT-6.1 Sol39.7pp
  3. 3Claude Haiku 5.543.9pp
  4. 4Claude Opus 5.547.2pp
  5. 5GPT-6 Astra47.2pp
  6. 6Claude Sonnet 5.547.2pp
  7. 7GLM-5.255.1pp
  8. 8GPT-6 Sol55.6pp
  9. 9Grok 4.658.3pp
  10. 10GPT-5.6 Luna59.1pp

Run completion

24 of 24 models completed all recorded runs without an unrecoverable error. Completion does not imply a correct answer or rule out a refusal. Recorded refusals: Claude Opus 5 (2), Claude Sonnet 5 (2). These attempts remain in the reported scores.

Task Completion RateTop 10 of 24
  1. 1Claude Opus 5.5100.0%
  2. 2Gemini 4 Argon100.0%
  3. 3GPT-6 Astra100.0%
  4. 4Claude Sonnet 5.5100.0%
  5. 5Grok 4.6100.0%
  6. 6GPT-6 Sol100.0%
  7. 7GPT-6.1 Sol100.0%
  8. 8Claude Opus 4.8100.0%
  9. 9Claude Haiku 5.5100.0%
  10. 10GPT-5.6 Sol100.0%

Measured Trade-offs

  • Claude Opus 5.5 — Highest observed benchmark score: 88.2% at $4.34/task.
  • GLM-5.3 Flash — Lowest measured cost: $0.28/task, with 62.3% benchmark score.

Methodology

Scoring

  • Score: Mean over three trials per task, scored against hidden rubrics authored with each environment. Detection engineering tasks are scored deterministically; free-form threat hunting and incident response reports are graded against the rubric by a single fixed LLM judge
  • Facts: Each rubric fact is a specific finding (a host, account, address, filename, or hash) the report must commit to. For report tasks the judge checks that the finding is actually asserted, not merely mentioned, and that it is tied to the evidence behind it; partial credit is per-fact, not per-report
  • Citations: Material claims must point at the evidence records they rest on; a correct finding without its supporting evidence earns reduced credit
  • Red herrings: Asserting a known benign lookalike as malicious applies a multiplicative penalty to the report; a violation is counted only when repeated independent judge passes agree
  • Detections: Submitted detection queries are re-executed against the case evidence and scored by exact-record F1 with no judge involved; rules that over-fire on the benign lookalikes lose precision
  • Cost / task: USD per logical evaluated task, including repeated attempts. A bundled question set counts its individual questions; a report counts once. Prompt caching is included; judge costs are excluded
  • Latency: Average elapsed time per logical evaluated task, using the export normalization for bundled question sets
  • Reliability / spread: On this page, highest minus lowest score across recorded tasks and trials, in percentage points (lower is tighter). The BlueBench reliability score is 100 minus the mean of these six spreads: inverted spread, not same-task repeatability

Environment Generation

  • Four generated Windows enterprise environments centered on Active Directory and the identity tier
  • Each environment is a small segmented enterprise with sustained baseline administration, deployment, backup, and monitoring activity
  • Simulated intrusions: a password spray with account manipulation, a domain persistence operation, a service-credential theft, and a long hands-on-keyboard operation
  • Matched benign red herrings in every case: authorized identity and administrative activity deliberately shaped to resemble the attack
  • Several thousand raw events per case across endpoint, network, identity, and directory log sources, exposed to the agent as raw files plus a queryable index

Task Design

  • Four tasks: one open-ended threat hunt, one incident response investigation, two detection engineering assignments
  • Every task starts from a single alert framed as a lead, not a conclusion
  • Threat hunting and incident response produce free-form reports, graded against the hidden rubric by a single fixed LLM judge; detection engineering returns structured answers plus a detection query, scored deterministically
  • Agents are told to execute their detection query and inspect the results before submitting

Controls

  • Same system prompt for all models, no per-model tuning
  • "Thinking" mode enabled where available
  • Three trials per task (k=3); reported scores are means over all 12 runs per model
  • Refused or failed runs score whatever they earn; nothing is excluded from the averages

System Prompt

System
You are a security analyst working an active case in Cotool. Available tools: - Execute commands in an isolated sandbox. - Write analysis scripts to a working directory. Case evidence: - Raw, heterogeneous telemetry for the case, plus a read-only queryable index over every record. - A manifest listing the source formats and record counts. Working requirements: - Treat the incoming alert as a lead, not a conclusion. - Work from raw evidence, correlate across source families, and preserve uncertainty. - Citations must reference the exact records returned by the evidence index. - Detection queries must be read-only and return the matching record identifiers. - Before submitting a detection query, execute it and inspect its result count and representative rows.
User
[Raw alert JSON] + Investigate this case end to end and write a single comprehensive report as your final response. The alert is a weak lead, not a conclusion. Proactively hunt across all of the available telemetry to determine what is actually happening. Correlate across source families and cite the specific evidence behind each material claim. Be rigorous about the limits of the evidence: clearly separate what the telemetry establishes from what it does not.
[Alert + task instructions]

Paraphrased. Tool names, file paths, and the evidence schema given to the agent are omitted.

Caveats

  • Results describe the current export and its recorded task mix; counts of repeated attempts can differ across models.
  • Spread is the highest minus lowest score across recorded tasks and trials. Different task difficulty and question bundling affect it; it does not isolate same-task repeatability.
  • Costs are USD per evaluated task, including repeated attempts. Bundled question sets use logical question counts; each report attempt is counted once. Provider prompt caching is included and judge costs are excluded.
  • In a track-filtered view, the score changes but cost and latency remain the benchmark-wide averages; spread is shown only in the all-tracks view.
  • Report scores depend on LLM judging. Detection queries are executed against the evidence. Close scores do not establish a statistically significant ordering.

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